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"The Church most severely forbids everywhere marriages between two baptised persons, one of whom is a
Catholic, the other a member of a heretical or schismatical
sect; and if there is a danger of perversion for the Catholic
party or the offspring the marriage is forbidden also by
Divine law."
Canon 1060.
DAVID A. SCHUENKE
Joinder of Parties: Effect of No-Action Clause Valid in State
Where Insurance Contract Made Upon Joinder of Insurer Under
Section 260.11(1)-A direct action was brought against defendant
non-resident insurer, who had issued an automobile liability policy
in Kansas to a Wisconsin taxicab company, for injuries sustained in
Wisconsin as a result of the negligence of the taxicab company. This
policy contained a "no-action" clause' which is recognized as valid in
Kansas. Upon motion of insurer to dismiss the complaint against
him on the ground that insurer is not a proper party. Held: that an
insurer is not subject to direct action in Wisconsin by the injured
party in view of the construction of Wis. Stats. Sec. 260.11
(1)2 as not permitting direct action in such case before the amount
for which the insurer may be liable has first been determined either
by agreement or by final judgment against the insured. Klabacka v.
Midwestern Automobile Insurance Co., 146 F. Supp. 243 (W.D. Wis.
1956).
The principal case again raises the question of what effect, if any,
3
Watson v.Emplyoers Liability Assurance Corp. has had on the Wis4
consin decision of Ritterbusch v. Sexsinith. In the Ritterbusch case
the no-action clause was contained in a policy issued in Massachusetts
where such clause is valid but the party insured resided in Wisconsin.
Our Court held that the no-action clause was effective to postpone di1 The standard form of such clause reads: "No action shall lie against the

company until the amount for which the assured is liable by reason of any
casualty covered by this policy is determined by final judgement against the
insured or by agreement between the insured and the plaintiff with the
written consent of the company."
In any
2WiS. STATS. §260.11(1) (1955), the pertinent provision being: .
action for damages caused by the negligent operation, management, or control of a motor vehicle, any insurer of motor vehicles, which had an interest
in the outcome of such controversy adverse to the plaintiff or to any of the
parties to such controversy, or which by its policy of insurance assumes or receives the right to control the prosecution, defense or settlement of the claim
or action of the plaintiff or any of the parties to such claim or action, or
which by its policy agrees to prosecute or defend such action brought by the
plaintiff or any of the parties to such action or agrees to engage counsel to
prosecute or defend such action, or agrees to pay costs of such litigation is
by this section made a proper party defendent in any action brought by the
plaintiff on account of any claim against the insured."
3 Watson v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954).
4Ritterbusch v. Sexsmith, 256 Wis. 507, 41 N.W. 2d 611 (1950).
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rect action against the insurer until after adjudication of liability
against the insured notwithstanding Sec. 260.11 (1) which provides
that the insurer is a proper party in an action against the insured.
The Watson case involved a policy of insurance issued in Massachusetts and Illinois containing a no-action clause. The suit was
brought in Louisiana where the statute5 provided that a no-action
clause in an insurance policy shall be no bar to a direct action against
an insurance company regardless of whether such policy is issued in
Louisiana or in any other state. 8 The United States Supreme Court
held that this statute is not violative of the Full Faith & Credit, Due
Process or Impairment of Contracts provisions of the Federal Constitution.
Does this decision change the law in Wisconsin as stated in the
Ritterbusch case? The principal case answers this question in the
negative. The federal court there adopts the view that the Ritterbusch
case had construed Sec. 260.11(1) as being inapplicable to policies
written in states recognizing such clauses as valid. And since the
Louisiana statute7 involved in the Watson decision was different from
ours in that it specifically referred to policies written in other states,
that case was not a controlling precedent.
The court said:
"In short, the court simply held in the Watson case that
the Louisiana statute which completely abrogated the 'no-action'
clause of insurance policies, was valid. Wisconsin has no such
statute. It could pass a statute similar to the Louisiana statute
but has not elected to do so, and until it does the rule in the
Ritterbusch case, and the others cited herein, remains the law
of this state which this court must adopt." s
Some state circuit courts have held a contrary view.9 But upon
viewing the decisions of the Wisconsin Supreme Court prior to Ritterbusch it seems that the principal case has arrived at the proper
conclusion.
In Morgan v. Hunt10 the Court held that a no-action clause did
not offend the provision of Sec. 85.9311 (then Sec. 85.25) imposing a
5LA. REv. STATS. §22.655 (1950); as amended by Act 541 of the Louisiana

Legislature of 1950.
This right of direct action shall exist whether the policy sued upon
was written or delivered in the state of Louisiana or not and whether or
not such policy contains a provision forbidding such action, provided the
accident or injury occurred within the state of Louisiana....
7 Ibid.
8
Klabacka v. Midwestern Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 146 F. Supp.

6Ibid......

243, at 245 (W.D. Wis. 1956).

9Arnold & Gaines, Does the Decision in the Watson Case Override Ritterbusch v. Sexsmith, Milwaukee Bar Association Gavel, Spring & Summer
(1956).
10 Morgan v. Hunt, 196 Wis. 298, 220 N.W. 224 (1928).
:1 Wis. STATS. §85.93 (1955): "Any bond or policy of insurance covering lia-
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direct liability upon insurers to the injured party. Such a clause only
postponed the time when such liability could be asserted. The no-action
clause was given effect and suit dismissed as to the insurer.
The question of joining an insurer as a party defendant under Sec.
85.93 was raised again in Bergstein v. Popkin12 and the Court reaffirmed its decision of the Morgan case but clearly outlined what kind of
statute the Legislature would have to adopt before such joinder would
be permitted. Following this suggested method, the Legislature in 1931
amended Sec. 260.11(1) to read as it now does. 13 The amendment
clearly provided for joinder of an insurer as a defendant in cases in.volving automobile liability policies.
In Lang v. Baumann14 the Wisconsin Court held that this joinder
provision evidenced a legislative intent to make the no-action clause
ineffective to postpone direct action. In that case the Court referring
to the amendment suggested in Bergstein said:
"The court plainly indicated the sort of amendment that
it considered necessary to render ineffective clauses postponing
actions against the insurer until judgment had been taken
against the insured. The legislature has followed the precise
method suggested by the court and the amendment immediately
followed the decision in this case. We entertain no doubt that
the legislative intent was
to change the doctrine of the Morgan
5
and Bergstein cases."'
Oertel v. Williams' 6 involved a no-action clause in a policy issued
in Wisconsin but after issuance the insured moved to Pennsylvania
and was a resident of that State when the collision occurred in Indiana.
Indiana has no provision for joining an insurer as a party defendant.
The court held that:
"Whether under the law of Indiana the insurer can or cannot,
as a matter of procedure, be joined, against its objection, as
defendant in such action is immaterial. That ispurely a question of procedural law, as to which, under the rule that the law
of the forum governs all matters relating to the remedy, the
conduct of the trial, and the evidence, (citations
omitted) the
17
procedural law of this state is controlling.'

bility to others by reason of the operation of a motor vehicle shall be
deemed and construed to contain the following conditions: That the insurer
shall be liable to persons entitled to recover for the death of any person, or
for the injury to any person or property, irrespective of whether such liability be in praesenti or contingent and to become fixed or certain by final
judgement against the insured, when caused by the negligent operation, maintenance, use or defective construction of the vehicle described threin, such
liability not to exceed the amount named in said bond or policy."
'2 Bergstein v. Popkin, 202 Wis. 625, 233 N.W. 572 (1930).
13See
note 2 supra.
14 Lang v. Baumann, 213 Wis. 258, 251 N.W. 461 (1933).
25 Id. at 464.
16 Oertel v. Williams, 214 Wis. 68, 251 N.W. 465 (1934).
17 Id. at 466.
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In Beverly v. Thorpe'8 the Court held that a no-action clause in a
state recognizing such clauses as valid retained its vitality in a suit in
Wisconsin. Joinder of the insurer as a party defendant was not allowed
because Sec. 260.11 (1), although merely procedural, 9 also takes away
a valuable right and to apply it to a contract good in the state where
written would be unconstitutional as an impairment of a valid contract.
Ritterbusch v. Sexsmith made passing reference to the constitutional
ground applied in Byerly. The decision was in fact, though, made to
rest upon the conflict of laws doctrine that the law of the state where
a policy is issued determines the efficacy of the no-action clause.
"No case has been cited to us from the decisions of this
court or any other court which holds that the obligation of an
automobile liability policy is to be interpreted by any law other
than that of the state where the contract was made. Considering
the great volume of litigation growing out of automobile accidents this dearth of authority is significant and not to be explained except by acknowledging the principle that the law of
the state where the contract is made determines the obligation
of the contract, not the law of the place of performance." 20
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has steadfastly refused to give
extra-territorial effect to Sec. 260.11(1) in every case where the issue
was raised. Whether these decisions have in fact construed Sec.
260.11(1) as being inapplicable to the policies under consideration or
whether instead the conflict of laws rule of Ritterbusch controls; the
result would appear to be the same, viz., Sec. 260.11(1) does not apply
to policies of insurance containing a no-action clause recognzied as
valid in the state where the policy was issued.
DONALD GANCER

Errors in Framing Special Verdict and Instructions: Necessity
of Motion for New Trial Grounded Thereon as Prerequisite to
Availability on Appeal-On trial of an auto negligence action,
counsel for the defendant objected to the form of a special verdict
proposed for submission to the jury, pointing out to the court that
the special verdict was duplicitous in that it permitted .finding
defendant's deceased driver negligent not only as to lookout, but
also as to management and control. The jury returned a special
verdict under which the driver was found causally negligent as to
speed, lookout, and management and control. After verdict, the
defendant moved for a new trial. The motion for new trial specified five grounds in support thereof, none of which specifically
IsByerly v. Thorpe, 221 Wis. 28, 265 N.W. 76 (1936); Followed in Kilcoyne v
Trausch, 222 Wis. 528, 269 N.W. 276 (1936).
39 See notes 16 & 17 supra.
20 See note 4 supra, 256 Wis. at 515, 41 N.W. 2d at 615. Two justices dissenting
to this statement of the conflict of laws rule.

